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THE EUROPEAN ORIGINS AND THE SPREAD
OF THE CORPORATE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Franklin

A. Gevurtz •
I. INTRODUCTION

Much of the study of comparative corporate governance focuses on differences between the approaches of different nations-e.g., two-tier versus single-tier boards, 1 codetermination
versus election of directors solely by the shareholders, 2 shareholder primacy norm versus stakeholder models,3 and especially
in the last few years, wide dispersal of stock holdings versus
dominance by large block holders. 4 This Article, however, focuses
on a similarity: Around the world, the legal norm is that corporations are managed by, or under the direction of, a board of directors.5

* Cl 2004, Franklin A. Gevurtz. All rights reserved . Professor of Law, University of
the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law . Thanks to my research assistant, Daniel Del Rio, for
his work on this Article.
1. E.g. Thomas J . Andre , Jr., Some Reflections on German Corporate Governance: A
Glimpse at German Supervisory Boards, 70 Tu!. L. Rev. 1819 (1996).
2. E.g. Klaus J. Hopt, European Community: New Ways in Corporate Governance:
European Experiments with Labor Representation on Corporate Boards, 82 Mich. L. Rev.
1338 (1984).
3. E.g. Michael Bradley, Cindy A. Schipani, Anant K. Sundaram & James P. Walsh,
Challenges to Corporate Governance: The Purposes and Accountability of the Corporation
in Contemporary Society : Corporate Governance at a Crossroads, 62 L. & Contemp. Probs.
9 (1999).
4. E.g. Brian R. Cheffins, Corporate Governance Convergence: Lessons from Australia,
16 Transnatl. Law. 13 (2002); Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 539 (2000) .
5. E.g. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 14l(a) (2001); Rev. Model Bus. Corp. Act§ 8.01 (ABA
1984); Richard M. Buxbaum & Klaus J. Hopt, Integration through Law: Legal Harmonization and the Business Enterprise: Corporate and Capital Market Law Harmonization Policy in Europe and the U.S .A . (1st ed., Walter de Gruyter Inc. 1988) (discussing the use of
boards in Europe); Howard Gensler, Company Formation and Securities Listing in the
People's Republic of China, 17 Hous. J. Intl. L. 399 (1995) (discussing the use of boards in
China); Christopher L. Heftel, Survey , Corporate Governance in Japan: The Position of
Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations, 5 U. Haw. L. Rev. 135 (1983) (discussing the
use of boards in Japan ). An important caveat to this statement comes from the German
two-tier board model, under which there is both a supervisory board and a management
board . Andre, supra n. 1, at 1821.
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It is worth focusing on this similarity because it represents
something of a paradox. Despite differences in culture, political
institutions, and business traditions, nations have converged
upon a common institution-albeit
with variations-for
the governance of larger business organizations. This has happened notwithstanding the historic and continuing litany of complaints to
the effect that boards of directors do little. 6 Instead-in fact, if not
in law-managers
(particularly the chief executive officer), not
boards of directors, typically run corporations with widely dispersed shareholdings,7 while dominant shareholders, not boards
6. E.g. Robert A. Gordon, Business Leadership in the Large Corporation 143 (1st ed.,
U. of Cal. Press 1966) (concluding that "the board of directors in the typical large corporation does not actively exercise an important part of the leadership function"); Myles L.
Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality 107 (1st ed., Harv. Bus. Sch. Press 1986) (discussing a
study finding that directors rarely challenged or monitored CEO performance and often
served as little more than "attractive ornaments on the corporate Christmas tree"); Rita
Komik, Greenmail: A Study of Board Performance in Corporate Governance, 32 Admin. Sci.
Q. 163, 166--167 (1987) (noting that the modem board is a "co-opted appendage institution"); Myles L. Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality-Ten Years Later, 32 Rutgers L. Rev.
293, 297 (1979) (explaining that study reaffirmed results of earlier study as to director
passivity). These sorts of complaints are nothing new. E.g. William 0. Douglas, Directors
Who Do Not Direct, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1305, 1305 (1934) (pointing out, in 1934, that a popular theme had become that "[d]irectors should assume the responsibility of directing"). Nor
are such complaints limited to boards in the United States. E.g. Oxford Analytica Ltd.,
Board Directors and Corporate Governance: Trends in G7 Countries over the Next Ten
Years 267 (2d ed., Blackwell Bus. 1992) (reprinted in Robert A.G. Monks & Nell Minow,
Corporate Governance 275 (2d ed., Blackwell Bus. 1995) (explaining that, in Japan, "Formal authority is held by the company president and the board of directors, but meetings
are infrequent and decisions are rubber stamped"-in
reality, "Real authority is held by
the company president and the operating committee," composed of the president's immediate subordinates); Monks & Minow, supra, at 301 (explaining that the president directorgeneral (PDG) of French companies "wields almost unchecked control over the el\terprise
... without the counter-power of the board of directors," whose composition and agenda
the PDG controls; "(i]ndeed, it is regarded as 'bad manners' for the board to take a vote on
a management decision"); Roe, supra n. 4, at 568 (explaining that German corporate supervisory boards meet infrequently and that their information has been weak). Moreover,
despite claims of improvements in corporate board governance, recent scandals again have
produced complaints about passive boards. E.g. The Way We Govern Now, 366 The Economist 59, 59 (Jan. 11-17, 2003) (discussing poor board governance in light of corporate
scandals involving Enron); Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and
Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1233, 1241-1242 (2002) (describing Enron's board as "a splendid board on paper," and
explaining that its failure reveals "a certain weakness with the board as a governance mechanism"); Michael C. Jensen & Joseph Fuller, What's A Director to Do?
http://papers.ssm.com/abstract=357722
(Oct. 2002) ("The recent wave of corporate scan dals provides continuing evidence that boards have failed to fulfill their role as the toplevel corporate control mechanism.").
7. E.g. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of the Corporation: A Legal Analysis 139
(1st ,,d., Little, Brown & Co. 1976); Mace, supra n. 6, at 293-294; Monks & Minow, supra
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of directors, commonly run corporations with concentrated shareholdings. 8 Given the worldwide adoption of an institution whose
designated role seems belied by reality, it is fair to ask whose idea
the corporate board of directors was and how this institution
spread around the world.
This Article explores, on three levels, the origins of the
worldwide norm that corporations are managed by, or under the
direction of, a board of directors. The first level is descriptive:
Part II of this Article seeks to trace the geographic origin of the
corporate board and gives examples of how the use of corporate
boards spread. The next level is analytical: Having traced, in Part
II, the geographic origin of the corporate board to Europe, Part III
of this Article asks why the corporate board originated in Europe
and spread from there. Part III presents a short version of a thesis9 that the board of directors arose out of medieval European
political ideas. The reason, then, that board governance did not
arise outside of Europe is because political and cultural ideas
were different. However, the spread of the corporate board to nonEuropean business organizations did not occur because of the
spread of European political ideas, although it may have coincided with the spread of these ideas. Rather, it reflected a questionable supposition, at a time when the origins of the corporate
board had passed into the mists of history, about the purpose and
the impact of corporate boards.
Finally, Part IV of this Article addresses the normative level:
It asks why it matters why the board originated in Europe and
spread from there. In fact, the reasons why corporate boards
arose in Europe and spread from there can tell us much about the
n. 6, at 275; Omord Analytica Ltd., supra n. 6, at 269.
8. E.g. F. Hodge O'Neal & Robert B. Thompson, O'Neal's Close Corporations § 1.08
(3d ed., Callaghan 1988) (explaining that shareholders govern the closely held corporation); Gordon Walker, Corporate Governance in East Asia: Prospects for &form, in Corporate Governance: An Asia-Pacific Critique 582-583 (Low Chee Keong ed., Sweet & Maxwell
Asia 2002) (discussing shareholder control in the closely held corporation). According to a
study, done for the World Bank, of nine East Asian countries-Hong
Kong, Indonesia,
Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand - "more
than two-thirds of firms are controlled by a single shareholder; ... separation of manage ment from ownership control is rare; ... [and] the top management of about [sixty percent]
of the firms that are not widely held is related to the family of the controlling shareholder."
Id. at 582.
9. The Author intends to document this thesis, at length, in a forthcoming article
titled, The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of Directors.

928

Stetson Law Review

[Vol. XXXIII

realism of the assumption-often
underlying law-and-economics
analyses of corporate governance issues-that
a rational search
for efficiency dictates business governance structures. These reasons also can say much about the promise and the pitfalls of the
study of comparative law as a force for change.
Before beginning this exploration, it is useful to clarify essentially what a corporate board of directors is. We cannot simply
rely on the label, not only because of the different languages involved in a comparative study, but also because, as one delves
into the historical development of the corporate board, terminology changes. Moreover, defining the concept of a corporate board
of directors presents a tricky "Goldilocks" problem. If the definition is too broad and equates any group that manages a corporation with a board, we deprive the concept of any real meaning.
After all, any company of any size will have some group of people
involved in its management. Conversely, if one attempts to define
the concept too precisely, we lose the essential universality of the
institution in variations as to details, such as two-tier boards and
codetermination.
The best that we can do is to say that the essence of the corporate board of directors comes from three underlying concepts,
which involve the relationship of the directors to the shareholders, the relationship of the directors to each other, and the relationship of the directors to the corporation's executives. The first
underlying concept of corporate governance by a board of directors
is that shareholders, unlike partners, do not, simply by virtue of
being the owners, manage the corporation. 10 Instead, they (or under codetermination, they and the employees) normally elect a
group of persons (the directors) to have ultimate responsibility for
management. 11 The second concept is that a board of directors
makes decisions by acting together as a group of peers, 12 as opposed to the hierarchical arrangements and divisions of responsibility common among officers of any organization. The third con10. Franklin A. Gevurtz, Corporation Law § 3.1.3(a) (1st ed., West 2000).
11. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 2ll(b); Rev. Model Bus. Corp. Act§ 8.0l(b); Gevurtz, supra
n. 10, at§ 3.1.3(a); but see Jesse H. Choper , John C. Coffee, Jr . & Ronald J. Gilson, Cases
and Materials on Corporations 54 (5th ed., Aspen Publishers, Inc. 2000) (discussing system
in Netherlands whereby corporate board itself- not shareholders-appoints
successors of
some Dutch corporate boards).
12. Baldwin v. Canfield, 1 N.W. 261, 270 (Minn . 1879).
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cept is that the corporation's senior executives are ultimately answerable to the board. 13

II. THE GEOGRAPHIC ORIGIN AND THE SPREAD OF THE
CORPORATE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
A. The Earliest Corporate Boards
As stated at the outset of this Article, most corporations
formed around the world today have boards of directors. However,
if we look back to the seventeenth century, large European companies had boards of directors, but fairly large businesses owned
and operated by non-Europeans did not. 14 This suggests that the
corporate board of directors originated in Europe.

1. Use of Boards by the Early European Trading
Companies and Banks
The use of the term "director" to describe the members of a
corporation's governing board traces the 1694 charter of the Bank
of England. 15 Yet, the use of governing boards among European
companies-albeit
with different titles for their members-was
already old by that time. To give a pair of nicely documented examples, the East India companies used governing boards as early
as the beginning of the seventeenth century. 16
On the very last day in 1599, Queen Elizabeth I granted a
charter to the Earl of Cumberland and 215 knights, aldermen,
and merchants to become "a body politic and corporate" by the
name of the "Governor and Company of Merchants of London
trading into the East Indies." 11 The result was to create what
came to be known as the East India Company. 18 This charter
committed the direction of the voyages and the management of all

13. Eisenberg, supra n. 7, at 162. This, of course, is the legal theory. As stated above,
reality commonly diverges from this theory.
14. Infra pt. II(A)(l) (discussing the use of boards by early European trading companies and banks) and pt . Il(A)(2) (discussing nonboard governance in large, non-European
businesses) .
15. Ronald R. Formoy, The Historical Foundations of Modern Company Law 20, 21
(Sweet & Maxwell, Ltd. 1923).
16. George Cawston & A.H. Keane, The Early Chartered Companies 86-87 (Burt
Franklin 1968).
17. Id . at 87.
18. Id. at 86.
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other things belonging to the company to a governor 19 and twentyfour persons called "committees. "20 Hence, the term "committees"
predated the title "director" as the label attached to the elected
members of a corporation's governing board. The charter named
Sir Thomas Smith as the first governor, but provided that the
members of the company annually would elect the committees, 21
who would choose, from among themselves, a governor. 22
Two years after the formation of the English East India Company, the Dutch government chartered the Dutch (or United)
East India Company. 23 The charter (octroi) of the Dutch East India Company provided for governance by a general council of governors, known as Bewindhebbers. 24 This council had sixty members, broken down into a certain number of representatives from
each of the various "chambers" that had come together to form the
Dutch East India Company. 25 These chambers consisted of
smaller groups of merchants in Amsterdam (which had twenty
representatives on the council), Rotterdam and Delft (which had
fourteen representatives), Hoorn and Enkhuizen (which had fourteen representatives), and Zealand (which had twelve representatives) .26 These merchant groups already had formed shipping
companies for trade with the East Indies. 27 Evidently, a sixtymember board proved unwieldy, so the Dutch East India Company established a second, smaller board-the
Collegium-with
seventeen members .28 This board also had a certain number of
representatives from each of the chambers-Amsterdam
received
eight, Zealand received four, and the other two chambers each

19. The chief executive officer of such early corporations commonly had th e title "governor," rather than "president" or more modernly "CEO."
20. Id. at 87 .
21. Id .
22. Cyril O'Donnell, Origins of the Corporate Executive, 26 Bull. of the Bus. Hist . Soc.
55, 67 ( 1952).
23. M. Schmitthoff; The Origin of the Joint-Stock Company, 3 U. Toronto L.J. 74 , 75
(1939).
24. Id. at 94.
25. Winfried van den Muijsenbergh, Symposium: The Globalization of Corporate and
Securities Law in the Twenty-First Century: Corporate Governance: The Dutch Experience,
16 Transnatl. L. 63, 64 (2002) .
26. E.g. Holden Furber, Rival Empire s of Trade in the Orient 1600-1800 , at 188 (U. of
Minn . Press 1976) .
27. Schmitthoff , supra n. 23, at 93.
28. Muijsenbergh, supra n . 25, at 64 .
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received two. 29 The seventeenth position rotated among the chambers.30
The East India companies were entirely typical in providing
for governance by a board. Among other English trading companies, the 1670 charter of the Hudson's Bay Company provided for
a board of seven committees, 31and the charters of both the Russia
Company, in 1555, and the Eastland Company, in 1579, provided
for boards of twenty-four "assistants" (yet an older term for directors) .32By contrast, while the first charter of the Levant Company, in 1581, did not provide for a corporate board, this was explicable by the fact that the company started with only four members .33As soon as the company's membership grew, the company
obtained a new charter in 1593 calling for a board of twelve assistants.34

2. Non-Board Governance in Large Businesses beyond European
Influence : The Japanese Merchant House Example
At the time at which sixteenth- and seventeenth-century
European trading and banking corporations already were using
board governance, businesses owned and operated by nonEuropeans did not seem to be employing such an institution . This
was not because non-Europeans did not own and operate fairly
large-scale businesses. Rather, it was because larger business
organizations outside the ambit of European influence utilized
different management structures. The Japanese merchant houses
prior to the Meiji Restoration in 1868 provide a good illustration .
For almost two and one -half centuries prior to the nominal
restoration of imperial control in 1868, under Emperor Meiji, hereditary regents (shoguns) of the Tokugawa family ruled Japan. 35
During this era, Japan was largely closed off from the West. 36 The
country was organized under a sort of feudal system, in which
29. Id .
30. Id.
31. Cawston & Keane, supra n. 16, at 280.
32. E.g. O'Donnell, supra n . 22, at 60 , 63 .
33. John P . Davis, Corporations: A Study of the Origin and Development of Great
Business Combinations and of Their Relation to the Authority of the State vol. 2, 88
(Knickerbocker Press 1905).
34. Id . at 90-91.
35. Rodney Clark, The Japanese Company 13 (Yale U . Press 1979).
36. Id .
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local lords (daimyo ), who owed allegiance to the shogun, ruled
37
over the domains (han), into which the country was divided.
Four main orders comprised Japanese society at this time: (1) the
warriors (samurai), (2) the peasants (farmers), (3) the artisans,
and (4) the merchants, who, under Confucian theory, represented
the most inferior class insofar as the merchants simply distributed goods that others produced. 38 Yet, despite this picture of a
feudal, agrarian society in which merchants stood at the lowest
rung, it would not be true that Japan, during the era of Tokugawa
rule, lacked fairly large-scale business organizations . These business organizations took the form of merchant houses . Not only did
the merchant houses engage in distributing and selling commodities in Japan's populous cities-including
wood, oils, cotton, and
huge quantities of rice-but the merchant houses also used the
39
wealth from trade for money lending and investments.
The merchant house was a subset of the broader organization
of all four orders of Japanese society at this time into houses (ie)
which, at their simplest, consisted of the head of the household
and his wife, his eldest son, the son's wife, and the househead's
younger, unmarried children.4° It was the house, rather than the
individuals, that owned property or had other rights , so that the
hereditary offices of some samurai were t~e rights of certain
samurai houses, and peasant houses had the right to farm certain
pieces of land .41 In the case of merchants, the house owned the
business assets. 42 The current head of the household managed

37. Id .
38. Id . Unlike European feudalism, which tied status to ownership of property, neither
the daimyo nor the samurai owned estates. Johannes Hirschmei er & Tsunehiko Yui , The
Development of Japanese Business 1600-1973 , at 14 (Harv. U . Press 1975) . The daimyo
were, to some extent , the equivalent of administrators , whom the slwgun could move to
different domains. Id. Because of a lack of war at this time, the samurai did not have much
to do and so existed off of stipends provided by their daimyo. Id .
39. Clark, supra n. 35, at 14. The principal borrow ers were the daimyo and the central
government . Hirschmeier & Yui, supra n. 38, at 34-35 . Reclamation of land constituted
one of the major investment opportunities . Id . at 34 . For a variet y of reason s- such as a
lack of workers because of the labor -intensive nature of Japan ese agriculture , and th e
separation of artisans and merchants into different social orders excluded from each others' economic spheres-the
merchant houses did not move into industrial activit ies as had
European merchants. Id . at 33-34. A number of merchant house s, however, became, in
effect, banking houses. Id. at 34-35 .
40 . Clark , supra n. 35, at 14.
41. Id . at 14- 15.
42. Id . at 14.
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these assets for the sake of the house, which encompassed his ancestors , the current generation, and his posterity. 43 In this sense,
the house functioned something like a corporation .44
Successful merchant houses grew beyond the simple structure of a head of the house, his eldest son, their wives, and unmarried children. In many instances, younger sons received some
of the property to set up branch houses (bunke) that operated under the overall house name .45 A few large houses, such as the Mitsui house, did not divide property between the sons, but gave
shares in ownership in the house to all of the sons .46 To bring fur ther talent into the house, the head of the household might adopt
the men who married his daughters and have them join the business .47 The merchants brought young nonfamily members into the
house as apprentices (detchi). 48 At age seventeen or eighteen, the
house would promote the detchi to tedai (a journeyman). 49 At age
thirty or over, a tedai could become a manager (banto). 50 In a large
house, there could be more than one banto, one or more of whom
then became the chief manager (shihainin ).51
The merchant house did not have a board, elected by the
owners, to make decisions as a group of peers with ultimate responsibility to select and to supervise the senior management of
the business . Instead , ultimate authority rested with the head of
the house , to whom all employees and house members owed a
duty of total obedience .52 In lieu of supervision by a board, the
head of the house faced several constraints . The first constraint
was the internal sense of obligation felt toward the house and its
members, including not just the current, living members, but also
ancestors and future generations .53 In addition, many houses had
43 . Id.
44 . Id. For an analysis along somewhat similar lines dealing with Chinese households,
see Teemu Rusk ola , Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship : Comparative Law and
Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective, 52 Stan . L. Rev. 1599, 1622-1633 (2000 ).
45. Hirschmeier & Yui , supra n. 38, at 39.
46. Id . at 38-39 .
47. Id . at 38.
48. Id. at 39.
49. Id .
50. Id .
51. Id.
52. Id. at 38- 39.
53. Id . at 41; see also Ruskola, supra n . 44, at 1628 (dis cussing obligations of th e head
of the household to other generations in the Chinese-clan businesses).
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house rules, adopted by earlier heads, that set out principles and
54
practices under which the business was to operate. These included requirements for honest dealings with outsiders, recitals of
general business precepts and virtues, and bylaws for governing
55
the business.
Finally, many merchant houses made decisions on the basis
of a discussion system. 56 This discussion system, while entailing
collaborative decision-making, differed from a corporate board of
directors in fundamental ways . Essentially, the discussion system
involved general meetings in which the journeymen employees
(tedai) participated in making business decisions, such as the
price to charge for goods. 57 Also, some houses had advisory councils of retired banto, together with the current shihainin, that
58
considered issues such as opening new operations. Still, this sort
of collaborative decision-making, with employee input or the advice of retired managers, is not the same as an elected board with
the ultimate power to select and supervise managers, and to
make decisions for the corporation.
Not only did the merchant house provide functional substitutes for the role of a board in supervising the head of the house,
but the system of primogeniture, under which the eldest son inherited control as the head of the house, also removed what could
have been a role for a board in selecting the chief executive officer .59Admittedly, the continuity of merchant houses over many
generations suggests that circumvention of primogeniture occurred in situations in which the eldest son lacked the capability
to successfully lead the house. 60 However, rather than involving
any board, this entailed the existing head of the house adopting a
son-in-law, or even a capable banto or shihainin, who could take
61
over as successor .
54. Hirschmeier & Yui, supra n. 38, at 40.
55. Id. at 40-41, 63--64.
56. Matao Miyamoto, Th€ Management Systems of Edo Period Merchant Houses , 13
Japanese Y.B. on Bus. History 97, 129 (1996).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See Hir schmeier & Yui, supra n. 38, at 38 (discussing the syst em of primogeniture) .
60 . See id . (explaining that "[t]he value -priority assigned to the House as an economic
unit, over family and blood considerations, led many ... merchants to put blood considerations aside").
61. Id. In an article on businesses operated by Chinese clans , Professor Teemu Rus -
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B. The Spread of Corporate Boards

1. European Colonies
The spread of corporate boards to European colonies is unremarkable, especially since one of the roles of the European trading companies governed by boards was to establish colonies. 62 In
addition to the East India companies and the Hudson's Bay Company, which were involved in colonization and had governing
boards, the London Company, which founded the Virginia colony,
and the Massachusetts Bay Company also had governing boards. 63
The Bank of the United States, chartered in 179164 (often
called the First Bank of the United States), illustrates the tendency of former colonies to copy board governance from European
institutions. It seems evident that the United States' bank's
twenty-five-person board was modeled on the twenty-four-person
board of the Bank ofEngland. 615 One demonstration of the English
bank's influence is that both the Bank of England and the First
Bank of the United States imposed term limits on directors: The
Bank of England's charter prevented one-third of the directors of
the Bank of England from seeking re-election, 66 while the charter
of the First Bank of the United States prevented one-quarter of
the directors from seeking re-election .67 In any event, given the
kola suggests that elders in the clan formed a council analogous to a board of directors.
Ruskola, supra n . 44, at 1650. While one can always analogize any group to a corporate
board of directors, there appear to be critical differences between the clan council of elders
and a corporate board of directors. There is no suggestion that members of the clan elected
the elders, as would the shareholders of a corporation. Moreover, the sources cited by Professor Ruekola indicate that the elders lacked the real power to select the managers of the
clan's business and largely had an honorary role. Id. at 1650 n . 200. Other sources make it
clear that the concept of a board of directors with ultimate power over management and
responsibility to the shareholders was unfamiliar to Chinese merchants in the nineteenth
century. E.g. Wellington K. K. Chan, Merchants, Mandarins, and Modern Enterprise in
Late Ch'ing China 70 (Harv. U . Press 1977). Instead, in the traditional Chin ese company,
the owners gave the manager unchallenged control , revi ewed the books once a year, and
replaced the manager ifreeulte were unsatisfactory . Id. at 71.
62. Jamee D . Cox & Thomas Lee Hazen, Cox & Hazen on Corporations vol. 1, § 2.02,
83 (2d ed., Aspen 2003).
63. William C. Morey, The Genesis of a Written Constitution, 1 Ann . of the Amer. Aced.
of Poli. & Soc. Sci. 529, 539- 541, 549 (1891) .
64. Pub. L. No. 1-10, § 1, 1 Stat . 191, 191 (1791) (expired 1811).
65. Compare id . at § 4, 192 (discussing the number and time of electing directors) with
The Bank of England Act, 1696, 8 & 9 Will. 3, c. 20, § 51 (Eng.) (discussing the election ofa
governor and twenty -four directors).
66. The Bank of England Act, 1696, 8 & 9 Will. 3, c. 20, § 52 (Eng.)
67. 1 Stat . at 193.

936

Stetson Law Revi,ew

[Vol. XXXIII

general adoption of the mother countries' institutions by European colonies, the ex-colonies' failure to utilize, rather than the
utilization of, corporate board governance would have required
some explanation.

2. Outsule of European Colonies: The Japanese Example
More interesting than the use of corporate boards in European colonies is the spread of corporate board governance to nations with other traditions. Once again, Japan provides a nice illustration. The development of corporate board governance in Japan came about with the introduction of the joint-stock company
as a form of doing business in that nation. 68 The importation of
this business form, in turn, was just one component of an effort to
introduce Western technology and ideas into Japan following the
Meiji Restoration in 1868.69
As discussed earlier, before 1868 Japan was a largely isolated
feudal society under the rule of the Tokugawa shoguns. 10 Dissatisfaction with this situation arose from a variety of sources, including economic dislocations, the growing realization of Japan's military vulnerability due to the West's superior technology, and the
influence of Western ideas and institutions on the intelligentsia. 11
Among the institutions that had impressed the few Japanese who
traveled to the West before 1868 was the joint-stock company. 72
While we currently tend to refer to this form of business as a
"corporation" 73 (especially in the United States), the term "jointstock company" not only tracks international and historical usage,74 but also focuses attention on the feature of this form of
business that was most attractive to the Japanese observers .
The joint-stock company, or business corporation, raises capital by selling fungible interests in the business to investors, who

68 . See Clark, supra n . 35, at 33 (discussing the rise of the joint-stock company in
Japan).
69 . Id. at 18.
70. Id. at 13.
71 . Hirschmeier & Yui, supra n. 38, at 20, 70-71.
72 . Clark, supra n . 35, at 29 .
73 . Or , more precisely, a business corporation, as opposed to a nonprofit corporation or
a municipal corporation.
74 . See Alfred F . Conard, Corporations in Perspective §§ 66-69, 129-138 (The Found.
Press 1976) (tracing the etymology and usage of the term "corporation ").
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thereby become stockholders. 75 During the 1860s, Japanese observers recognized the advantage of the Western joint-stock company as a mechanism for amassing large amounts of capital to
undertake projects, such as building and operating railroads, that
were otherwise beyond the means of the private sector in Japan. 76
Indeed, the advantage of the joint-stock company was not lost on
the Tokugawa government, which, shortly before its fall, tried to
pressure merchants in the ports that Japan had been forced to
open to Westerners to form trading companies to improve their
ability to compete. 77
At the start of 1868, disaffected young samurai from several
han forced the removal of the last shogun and formed a new government that spoke in the name of the Emperor. 78 The new government embarked upon a wide range of initiatives to end the
79
feudal regime, to modernize the economy, 80 and generally to introduce Western technology and institutions to Japanese culture .81
The joint-stock company was among the Western institutions
promoted by the new government. This started in the same manner attempted by the prior regime-pressuring
merchants into
forming such firms. 82However , these early joint-stock companies
failed in just a few years .83 A more successful effort at inducing
joint-stock companies occurred in the banking sector. In 1872, the
Japanese government issued a national banking ordinance, modeled on the United States' Banking Act of 1863.84 While the 1872
ordinance led only to the formation of four joint-stock companies
75. Gevurtz, supra n. 10, at§ 1.1.l(d).
76. Clark, supra n. 35, at 29 (quoting the 1866 writings of the Japanese educator Fukuzawa Yukichi).
77. Id. at 29-30.
78. Hirschmeier & Yui, supra n. 38, at 73. "[T}he Emperor was barely fifteen years
old" at the time. Id.
79. Id . at 74, 81-82. Initiatives to end the feudal regime in cluded initiatives abolishing
the han, terminating the status of daimyo, and absorbing the samurai into the economy.
Id .
80 . Id. at 74, 79, 83-84. Initiatives to modernize the economy included init iatives
introducing a national currency, reforming taxation, and ending the division of society into
four orders. Id.
81. Id . at 75-76. This included the introduction ofWestem-style clothes . Id .
82. Clark, supra n. 35, at 30.
83. Id. Government interference and management inexperience with foreign trade
were two reasons for the failure . Id .
84. Hirschmeier & Yui, supra n. 38, at 89.
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to operate banks, the government made revisions to the banking
ordinance in 1876. 85 Among other things, the 1876 revisions allowed the samurai to invest, as capital in the new banks, the
bonds that the samurai had received from the government in lieu
of their former stipends from the daimyo. 86 The 1876 revisions led
to the formation of over 150 joint-stock banking companies. 87
A major turning point in increasing the use of joint-stock
companies outside of the banking sector occurred in 1878, when
the government amended the system for chartering new companies and empowered local governments to grant permission for
joint-stock companies. 88 As a result, a wide variety of associations
and businesses could, and did, obtain the designation of a company.89At the same time, the government conducted an extensive
propaganda campaign to encourage the formation of, and investment in, joint-stock companies. 90 Along the same lines, as part of
the program to integrate the samurai into the economy, the government made business loans available to the samurai. 91 However, the government insisted that the samurai use these loans
only for joint-stock undertakings involving at least several samu• 92

rai.

Beyond governmental encouragement, the pressure of foreign
competition and high capital needs in industries, such as cottonspinning and the railroads, led to the formation of joint-stock
companies, usually with between 100 and 500 shareholders .93 Not
atypical by any country's standards, the creation of an overall
corporation law significantly lagged behind these developments
on the ground. It was not until 1893 that sections of a proposed
commercial code dealing with company law, based upon a draft by
the German advisor Hermann Roesler, came into force. 94 These
85 . Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88 . Id. at 112 .
89. Id.
90. Id .
91. Id. at 82.
92. Id.
93. Id . at 112.
94. Masao Fukushima , The Significance of the Enforcement of the Company Law
Chapters of the Old Commercial Code in 1893, 24 L. in Japan 171, 173, 183 (1991) (William Horton, trans .); Kenzo Takayanagi, A Century of Inn.ovation: The Development of
Japanese Law , 1868-1961 , in Law in Japan : The Legal Order in A Changing Society 31
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were then superseded by the enactment of the new commercial
code in 1899.95
The adoption of the board of directors as a governing institution for the joint-stock company arrived, albeit awkwardly, with
this form of business . As previously stated, the trading companies
formed as a result of government pressure at the beginning of the
Meiji era soon failed . Government interference, as well as management inexperience with foreign trade, hampered these companies, while confusion in efforts to adopt corporate board govern96
ance did not help. Because these companies required cooperation
between houses, the company organizers modeled the role of the
directors on the practices of the only previously existing organization that involved economic cooperation between merchant
houses-the merchant guild. 97 Copying from the system of rotating control employed in the pre -Meiji-era Japanese merchant
guilds, the early trading companies had three general directors
who took turns presiding over the company. 98 The directors were
assisted by thirty stewards, six of whom were on duty in any
month as the supervisors of the business departments .99 Needless
to say, this proved to be an awkward way to run a business .
The 1876 revision of the national banking ordinance not only
increased the number of joint-stock companies, but also established the norm of board governance for these companies . Specifically, the revised ordinance included model articles of incorpora100
tion. These articles provided for the selection of the bank's
at a
president (todori) from among the directors (torishimariyaku)
meeting of the directors. 101 Moreover, the banking ordinance empowered the president and the directors, at a meeting of the directors, to act according to the interests of the bank and to hire, fire,
and set salaries for bank personnel. 102 T:,.the absence of an overall
corporation law for joint-stock companies formed outside of bank(Arth u r Tayl or von Mehren ed ., Harv. U. Press 1963).
95. Takayangi, supra n . 94, at 31-32 .
96. Clark , supra n . 35, at 30 .
97 . Id .
98. Id .
99. Id .
100. Tsun ehiko Yui, The Development of the Organizational Strudure of Top Management in Meiji Japan, 1 Japan e se Y.B. on Bus. History 1, 4 (1984).
101. Id.
102. Id . at 5.

940

Stetson Law Review

[Vol. XXXIII

ing during the 1870s and 1880s, governance varied with the provisions of particular articles. 103 Nevertheless, the articles of such
companies commonly called for a board of directors. While provisions in the articles reflected considerable variation as to the directors' responsibilities, these article provisions , as with the
banks' provisions, typically contemplated joint action with the
president in making decisions for the companies and, somewhat
naively, focused on decisions regarding hiring and firing employees and setting salaries. 104
By 1893, when the corporate law provisions of the commercial
code went into effect, the concept of corporate governance under a
board of directors was already well established. 105 In any event,
the 1893 code affirmed the authority of the directors over the
joint-stock company. 106

III. WHY DID THE CORPORATE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
EVIDENTLY ORIGINATE IN EUROPE AND
SPREAD FROM THERE?
A. A Traditional Story

One constant in human history is the clever invention occurring in one part of the world and then spreading throughout the
globe as people in different lands copy the invention . For instance,
fine porcelain arises in China and the Europeans copy the idea.
The steam engine arises in Europe and spreads around the world.
An obvious explanation as to why the corporate board originated
in Europe and spread from there would follow along the same sort
of lines: The corporate board of directors was a clever invention by
the Europeans, who were looking for a mechanism to govern a
business in which large numbers of individuals would make passive investments and receive shares in the venture (the jointstock company) .
The republican model of corporate governance, in which
shareholders elect directors to manage the business, seems wellsuited to the firm that raises money by issuing ownership inter 103. See id . at 5-7 (providing examples of provision s from the articles of incorporation
of various joint-stock companies) .
104. Id .
105. See id . (giving examples of joint-stock companies, establish ed in Japan in the
1870s and 1880s, which were govern ed by a board of direct ors).
106. Id. at 12.
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ests to large numbers of investors-which interests will be attractive because they are freely transferable. "Because stockholders,
as such, do not directly participate in managing the corporation,"
there can be large numbers of owners who "can trade their stock
without disrupting the running of the company." 101 Of course, this
explains only why shareholders should not directly run the widely
held company with freely tradeable ownership. It does not explain
why shareholders should elect a board, instead of simply making
entirely passive investments, as in a limited partnership. 108
The predominant economics rationale states that boards
elected by shareholders exist as a necessary tool to monitor corporate management . Typically, this view starts with the assumption
that the corporate hierarchy exists to gain the advantage of team
production, while minimizing agency costs, like shirking and disloyalty, by having higher-level agents monitor lower-level
agents. 109 However, the problem then becomes who will monitor
the highest-level monitors. The traditional economics answer is
that the shareholders, as the residual claimants, have the best
incentives to monitor the highest-level agents. 110 This answer,
however, faces a practical difficulty in the publicly held corporation, since there are too many scattered shareholders to allow for
efficient monitoring directly by the shareholders. This, in turn,
leads to the argument that the corporate board, elected by the
shareholders, provides a solution to the practical difficulty of
shareholders monitoring on their own behalf. m
B. A Revisionist Story
The problem with the story outlined above is that it is simply
wrong in explaining why the corporate board of directors arose in
107. Gevurtz, supra n . 10, at 16.
108. See Michael K. Pierce & Jill E. Fisch, Overview of Substantive Law Governing
General Partnerships, Limited Partnerships, and Limited Liability Companies 5--6, 10-13
(ALI-ABA CLE Course of Study, 2003) (discussing and defining limited partnerships under
the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (RULPA) of 1985).
109. Stephen M. Bainbridge , Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 Vand . L. Rev . 1, 5- 7 (2002).
110. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 Am. Econ . Rev. 777, 782-783 (1972).
111. See e.g. Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & Econ. 301, 311 (1983) (explaining that "[t)he common apex of the decision
control systems of organizations ... in which decision agents do not bear a major share of
the wealth effects of their decis ions is so me form of board of directors").

942

Stetson Law Revi.ew

[Vol. XXXIII

Europe. Moreover, while the story might have some merit insofar
as non-Europeans copied the corporate board based upon the as sumption that it was the most efficient way to run a joint-stock
company, it is less clear whether the story is correct as to the real
impact of the corporate board. In other words, a board of directors
is not like a steam engine, an invention whose impact is unassail able. Specifically, if one builds a steam locomotive without a
steam engine, the train will not move. The same, however, may or
may not be true if one establishes a joint-stock company without a
board of directors.

1. European Corporate Board Governance Prior to the
Joint-Stock Company
The reason we can conclude that Europeans did not develop
the corporate board of directors to monitor management on behalf
of passive investors in the joint-stock company is that the board,
as an institution of corporate governance, predated the invention
of the joint-stock company by a century or more. In fact, the English and the Dutch East India companies, with their governing
boards, evolved from the so-called "regulated company"essentially a guild whose membership consisted of merchants
conducting independent operations under the company's franchise. In the second half of the sixteenth century, the English
government issued charters to companies of merchants, such as
the Russia Company, the Eastland Company, and the Levant
Company, granting the merchants the exclusive right (at least
among English subjects) to trade in a specified territory 112 and
providing for governance of the companies by boards. 113
The charters of the East India companies followed the same
pattern. 114 The regulated companies, like the Eastland Company,
112. Davis, supra n. 33, at 88-89, 97-98. The charter of the Russia Company granted
the merchants in that company exclusive rights, as far as English subjects, to trade in
Russia, as well as in "lands of infidels" discovered by the merchants of the company . Id . at
97-98. The Eastland Company's charter granted its merchants the exclusive right, among
English subjects, to trade with Scandinavia and the Baltic region, but not Russia. Cawston
& Keane, supra n. 16, at 61. The Levant Company's charter granted its members exclusive
trading rights with Turkey. Davis, supra n. 33, at 88.
113. Cawston & Keane, supra n. 16, at 61; Davis, supra n. 33, at 88--89, 98.
114. See Cawston & Keane, supra n. 16, at 87--88 (discussing the royal charter, granted
on December 31, 1599). The charter generously described the English East India Company's territory as encompassing all of Africa, Asia , and America, from the Cape of Good
Hope "to the Straits of Magellan." Id . at 87--88.
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did not conduct operations as a corporation. Instead, members of
a regulated company conducted the trading voyages, either individually or in groups, under the company's exclusive franchise. 115
The governing board of a regulated company adopted ordinances
regulating the members' activities. For example, the board of the
Eastland Company adopted a regulation prohibiting members
from engaging in "colouring" goods. 116 "Colouring" referred to selling the goods of a nonmember merchant as a member's own. 117 By
operating in this fashion-as
undisclosed principals-nonmembers attempted to circumvent the company's exclusive franchise.118As this example illustrates, the role of a regulated company's board was not to have overall responsibility for operating a
business, but to impose rules on individual merchants to preserve
a monopoly.
The Russia Company may have been the first to experiment
with operating as a joint-stock company-in other words, having
the merchants chip into a common fund to outfit the ships for
trading voyages under the company's command, rather than having the merchants conduct operations individually or in ad hoc
groups. 119Sources differ as to the extent to which the English and
Dutch East India companies operated from their inception as
joint-stock ~mpanies or went through a period in which they operated as regulated companies. 120 In the case of the English company, the confusion arises from the fact that the original charter
preserved the members' right to trade individually under the
company's franchise, much as in a regulated company, and from
the fact that not all of the members subscribed to the early voy115. See Davis, supra n. 33, at 112 (explaining that companies "first appeared as groups
of adventurers actuated by their personal interests").
116. Schmitthoff, supra n. 23, at 82 n. 30.
117. Id. at 82.
118. As one commentator has noted, "if it was possible for a [nonmember] to avail himself of the trading monopoly of the regulated company by inducing a member to trade as
his undisclosed agent, the monopoly was bound to become worthless." Id.
119. Id. at 91. Interestingly, the Russia Company may have started as a joint-stock
company and then regressed into a regulated company. Id. at 91-92.
120. Compare Davis, supra n. 33, at 118-119 (explaining that the English East India
Company did not conduct trading voyages as a corporation, rather than as individual merchants and merchant groups, until 1612) with William R. Scott, The Constitution and
Finance of English, Scottish and Irish Joint-Stock Companies to 1720, at 153-155 (Peter
Smith 1951) (explaining how, from its inception, the English East India Company conducted its voyages on a joint-stock basis, even though members invested on a per-voyage
basis rather than into permanent capital or joint stock of the company).
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ages financed on a joint-stock basis. 12 1 In the case of the Dutch
company, the failure of the charter to create, or even to mention,
a company-wide joint stock has led one noted scholar to conclude
that the individual chambers (companies of merchants in various
Dutch cities) actually conducted the initial operations of the
Dutch East India Company and that the role of the governing
councils was to coordinate the activities of the separate merchant
companies, much in the manner of a cartel. 122
In any event, it was not until the middle or toward the end of
the seventeenth century (historians disagree as to when) that the
English East India Company completed its evolution into a structure that we now associate with a joint-stock company (or business corporation). Voting rights in the East India Company began
to depend upon the amount each member invested in the permanent joint-stock, instead of being available to all members. 123 In
addition, the company no longer granted members the right to
trade on their own under the company's franchise. 124 As a result,
these two changes tied the benefits of membership in the English
East India Company-both
in terms of voting control and economic return-entirely
to a subscription into a common fund for
the company's activities, and thereby completely transformed the
company from a confederation of merchants into a vehicle for pas sive investment by the general public.
The use of boards by the late-sixteenth-century English regulated companies appears to derive from a pattern set by two of the
earliest companies of English merchants engaged in foreign trade:
the Company of Merchant Adventurers and the Company of the
Merchants of the Staple. 126 Despite its somewhat swashbuckling
121. Schmitthoff, supra n. 23, at 9~91.
122. Id. at 93-94 .
123. See Scott, supra n. 120, at 465 (explaining that voting rights in the East India
Company were limited, in 1650, to one vote for each £500 pounds sterling contribution) ;
Davis , supra n. 33, at 129-130 (noting that the new charter of 1693 gave one vote for each
£1000 pounds sterling contributed, up to a maximum often votes).
124. Compar e Samuel Williston, The History of the Law of Business CorporatioTUJBefore
1800, in Select Essays in Anglo -American Legal History vol. 3, 195, 200 (Comm . of Assoc. of
Am. L. Schs . ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1909) (discussing when members lost the right to
trade independently under th e East India Company's franchise toward the end of the
seventeenth century) with William Mitchell, Early Forms of Partnership , in Sel ect Essays
in Anglo -American Legal Hist ory vol. 3, 183, 194 (Comm. of Assoc. of Am . L. Schs . ed.,
Little, Brown & Co. 1909) (discussing when members lost the right to trade independently
under the East India Company's franchise in 1654).
125. Percival Griffiths, A Licence to Trade : The History of English Chart ered Compani es
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sound, "Merchant Adventurers" was a label used by English merchants who engaged in the export trade of manufactured goods. 126
During the fifteenth century, merchant exporters operating from
England had no formal, separate organization. 121 Instead, many of
them apparently were members of the Mercers Company, a London merchants' guild. 128 By the late-fifteenth century, however,
the London merchant exporters had come to view themselves as a
distinct fellowship with the title "Merchant Adventurers," and,
evidently, were operating in connection with the English merchants in the low countries .129
In 1505, Herny VII granted a charter to "The Company of
Merchant Adventurers," giving the company a monopoly on trade
in the export of English manufactures, although membership in
the company had to be open to any English merchant who paid a
fee. 130 More significantly, for purposes of this Article, this charter
placed governance of the company in a governor and an elected
board of twenty-four so-called "assistants ."131 The function of the
governor and the assistants was to resolve disputes among merchants and to enact ordinances for the regulation of the company's members. 132
The Merchants of the Staple take their name from the fixed
place (the Staple) to which, at various times, English law limited
all sales of raw wool exports (as opposed to the cloth exports handled by the Merchant Adventurers). 133 The compulsory staple system began in 1313 and moved around for half a century, until settling in Calais, which was then under English control. 134 Significantly, for purposes of this Article, a mayor and a council of

7, 9 (Ernest Benn Ltd. 1974).
126. Id. at 9.
127. Id . at 10.
128. Id.
129. Id .
130. Id .
131. Id.
132. Cawston & Keane, supra n. 16, at 249-251.
133. Griffiths, supra n. 125, at 6. The interest of the Merchants of the Staple in su ch a
limitation, particularly insofar as it could reduce competition and allow control over prices,
is obvious enough . The English kings saw this as a way to extract revenues from the wool
merchants . Eileen Power , The Wool Trade in English Medieval History 87--89 (Oxford U.
Press 1941).
134. Id . at 96-99.
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twenty-four governed the Company of the Merchants of the Staple
in Calais (and, for two years, also ran the city). 135
All told, two points are significant about the Company of
Merchant Adventurers and the Company of the Merchants of the
Staple. Both had governing boards, and neither was anything remotely like a joint-stock company. Instead, these were simply
merchant guilds that had certain exclusive rights granted by the
crown. Under these circumstances, the board hardly existed to
monitor management on behalf of passive investors or, in any
sense, to manage a business. As suggested by the charter of the
Merchant Adventurers, the board existed to resolve disputes and
to pass ordinances regulating members' conduct.

2. The Origins of Corporate Boards in Political
and Cultural Ideas
Since the corporate board of directors in Europe did not start
as a device to supervise management on behalf of passive investors in a joint-stock company, how did the idea originate? In fact,
corporate governance by a representative board, working with a
chief executive officer (a "governor" in the typical parlance of the
early corporate charters), is a reflection of widespread political
practices and ideas in Western Europe in the late Middle Ages.
Specifically, while fictional literature may frequently picture medieval Europe as a place of autocratic governance by kings, European political ideology and practice in the late Middle Ages, although hardly democratic, often called for the use of collective
governance by a body of representatives. Examples of such representative-governance ideas and practices are found in the assemblies or parliaments of medieval European kingdoms, in town
councils, in governing councils for guilds, and in the Church.
Given this prevalent practice, and the ideology that underlay this
practice, it was natural for the early corporations to utilize board
governance.
European kingdoms in the late-twelfth through fourteenth
centuries widely undertook the development and the use of representative assemblies, which are the precursors of today's parliaments. 136 While the English Parliament, because of its survival
135. Griffiths, supra n. 125, at 7.
136. Thomas N. Bisson, Medieval Representative Institutions : Their Origins and Nature
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and ultimate influence, is the most noted example, 137Spanish
kingdoms had their "Cortes," 138various Italian kingdoms had "assemblies,"139the French had their "Estates," 1'0 and the Germans
had the "Reichstag" (or diet), on an imperial level, and the "Landtage" on the level of the principalities. 141 Town councils appeared
in Italy by the end of the eleventh century 142 and sprouted up
throughout France, 143the low countries, 144England, 145 and Germany146throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The end
result was that town councils, commonly numbering twelve or
some multiple thereof, became a prevalent feature of medieval
. . 1governmen. t 147
E uropean mumcipa
The use of governing boards by medieval European guilds, for
the most part, occurred later than the development of medieval
European parliaments and town councils. In Italy, fourteenthcentury Florentine guilds provide examples of the use of complex
systems of councils that mirrored the complexity of Florentine
1
city government. ' 8 Guilds in some German cities had six- or
1 (The Dryden Press 1973).
137. See H.G. Richardson & G.0. Sayles, Parliaments and Great Councils in Medieval
England 1 (Stevens & Sons 1961) (reprinted in Bisson, supra n. 136, at 32-39) (discussing
the English parliament and describing it as "an easily recogni[z]able institution").
138. E.g. Michael A.R. Graves, The Parliaments of Early Modern Europe 14 (Pearson
Educ. Ltd. 2001) (referring to the first recorded "Cortes" (parliament) in Spain).
139. E.g. Bryce Lyon, Medieval Constitutionalism: A Balance of Power, in Studies of
West European Medieval Institutions 168-169 (Varioum Reprints 1978) (describing provincial assemblies in parts of Italy).
140. E.g. C.H. Mcilawin, Medieval Estates, in The Cambridge Medieval History vol. 7,
68~7
(listing the history and development of early Estates in France).
141. E.g. Graves, supra n. 138, at 23-24 (describing various assemblies in different
parts of Germany).
142. E.g. John H. Mundy & Peter Riesenberg, The Medieval Town 54 (D. Van Nostrand
Co. 1958) (listing the beginning of Milanese self-government as uometime between 1084
and 1097).
143. E.g. Carl Stephenson, Borough and Town: A Study of Urban Origins in England
40--41 (Medieval Acad. of Am. 1933) (listing privileges in the Noman capital ofRoven , self.
government among them, and cataloging several other cities in France with consular governments).
144. E.g. id. at 36--37 (describing the expanding role of town councils in Flanders).
145. E.g. Colin Platt, The English Medieval Town 129-132 (David McKay Co., Inc.
1976) (recounting portions of the "impressively detailed account" of the establishment of a
town council in Ipswich and some of its apparent parallels in other cities).
146. E.g. Susan Reynolds, Kingcroms and Communities in Western Europe 900-1300, at
174 (2d ed., Clarendon Press 1997) (defining consules as members of the ruling councils in
many German towns).
147. See id. at 191 (describing councils consisting "of twelve or twenty-four or some
other round number" as common in many towns across Europe).
148. E.g. Edgcumbe Staley, The Guilds of Florence 119-121 (Methuen & Co. 1906)
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eight-person councils by the fourteenth century. 149 In England, a
merchant-guild council of twenty-four members, who were virtually the same persons who served on the twenty-four-member
town council, existed at Leicester in the mid-thirteenth century. 150
For the most part, however, the move by the guilds toward the
use of boards of assistants occurred in the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries. 151 Not only did the use of governing boards in medieval
European guilds generally occur later than the parliaments and
town councils, but this also represented a retrenchment of earlier
governance of the guilds through meetings of the entire member. 152
S h1p.
A variety of councils were involved in the governance of the
medieval Church and church organizations. 153 The high point of
the use of councils in Church governance occurred when the
Council of Constance resolved the great schism and claimed, for
future councils, primacy over Papal authority. 154
A detailed account of the underlying ideas behind these representative institutions, and how those ideas came to be manifested in the early corporate boards, is beyond the scope of this
Article. For present purposes, suffice it to say that joint-stock
companies arose out of regulated companies, which were little
more than merchant guilds with an exclusive franchise. 155 Hence,
the linkage between board governance in the merchant guilds and
in the trading companies is easy enough to understand. The merchant guilds, in turn, were closely connected with medieval Euro(discussing the two councils in the Calimala guild).
149. E.g. Lujo Brentano, On the History and Development of Guilds and the Origin of
Trade-Unions 126 (Burt Franklin 1870) (giving, as examples, the councils of the Gardners
and Spinwetter guilds at Bale and the Tailors guild of Vienna) .
150. Platt, supra n. 145, at 133.
151. E.g. Brentano, supra n. 149, at 151-152 (tracing the development and role of a
Court of Assistants in the time of Queen Mary).
152. See id. at 194-195 (describing a meeting of a "Shoemakers ' Gild" in Arnstadt in
1628).
153. E.g. R.W. Carstens, The Medieval Antecedents of Constitutionalism 26-28 (Peter
Lang Publg., Inc. 1992) (describing governance of the Dominican Order).
154. E.g. Antony Black, Council and Commune: The Conciliar Movement and the Fifteenth-Century Heritage 17 (Patmos Press 1979) (discussing the actions and declarations of
the Council of Constance). lntimately, however, Papal supremacy was to prevail after the
Council of Basel. E.g. John N. Figgis, Political Thought from Gerson to Grotius: 1414-1625,
at 50-51 (Harper & Bros. 1907) (discussing the end of the Council of Basel in 1449).
155. Supra n. 112 and accompanying text (describing the evolution of early companies
from merchants working independently but under one franchise) .
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pean municipal governments,1 56 which, in part, explains the link
between company boards, boards in merchant guilds, and town
councils. Moreover, to medieval European jurists, both guilds and
towns were a universitates (essentially, a corporation) and, as
such, were subject to common norms of governance with other
corporations. 157 The medieval European guilds and town councils
themselves reflected political ideas and practices also manifested
in the medieval European parliaments and in the Church councils.158
The two functions of the board of the Merchant Adventurers
suggest some of the underlying ideas behind the European use of
representative councils. One function was the adjudication of disputes involving the merchants in the company. 159 The desire to
have a board of twenty-four (which, not coincidentally, is a multiple of twelve) hear disputes reflects the medieval European preference for group decision-making in adjudication 160-a preference
still reflected in the twelve-person jury. 161 The other function of
the Merchant Adventurers' board-adopting
ordinances to regulate the membership 162-reflects the medieval European preference for consensus when making decisions impacting all members
of the community .163
One manifestation of this preference for consensus occurred
when Canon Law jurists turned a Roman Law doctrine of quod
omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur ("what touches all is to be
approved by all") from a technical rule involving co-tutorship into
156. H.W.C. Davis, Mediaeual England 310 (Oxford U. Press 1924).
157. Antony Black, Guilds and Ciuil Society in European Political Thought from the
Twelfth Century to the Present 24-25 (Cornell U. Press 1984).
158. Id. at 44.
159. Griffiths, supra n. 125, at 11-12 .
160. Reynolds, supra n. 146, at 23-34. The reintroduction of Roman law in the twelfth
century led to the increasing use of single presiding judges in lieu of adjudication by collective groups, as had been characteristic of earlier medieval Europe. Id. at 51-52. Resistance
to this trend occurred in the preservation of trial by jury in England, and-significantly for
purposes of this Article-in mercantile matters where assemblies or groups of merchants
continued to try disputes. Id. at 53-58 .
161. Significantly, one of the main functions of medieval European parliaments and
town councils was the adjudication of disputes. E.g. Richardson & Sayles, supra n. 137, at
34-35 (arguing that the primary function of thirteenth-century
English parliaments was
judicial); Fritz Rorig, The Medieual Town 161 (U. of Cal. Press 1967) (explaining that a
primary function of early town councils was adjudicating disputes-particularly
mercantile disputes).
162. Griffiths, supra n . 125, at 11.
163. Reynolds, supra n. 146, at 302-305.
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a broad principle of governance. 164 This principle applied not only
to the Church, but to other "corporations" 166-using the term in
the broader sense of a collective group, including guilds and
towns-and was invoked in the summonses sent by kings demanding that representatives appear at a parliament .166 The role,
then, of a board, council, or parliament was to have representatives with full power (plena potestas) grant the consent required
on behalf of the broader community. 167
Just as medieval European political ideas were the source for
the corporate board, different political and cultural ideas meant
the absence of a board elsewhere. The governance structure of the
Japanese merchant house provides a good illustration. AB discussed earlier, the merchant house was part of the organization of
all four orders of Japanese society into houses, in which the head
of the house was entitled to obedience. 168 This family-oriented,
hierarchical organization is consistent with Confucian values. For
instance, Confucianism speaks of five relationships: ruler-subject,
father-son, husband-wife, elder brother-younger brother, and
friend-friend. 169 Four of the five are vertical relationships entitled
to unquestioned obedience .110

3. The Transplant of Corporate Board Governance: Post Hoc Ergo
Procter Hoc Reasoning and Culture Spread
By the
Europeans
history of
board was

nineteenth century, when the Japanese and other nonwere looking at adopting the joint-stock company, the
when and why Europeans developed the corporate
centuries old. It is unclear how many Europeans at

164. Brian Tierney, Medieval Camm Law and Western Constitutionalism, 52 Catholic
Historical Rev . 1, 13 (1966).
165. Black, supra n. 157, at 73 (citing J. Najemy, Guild Republicanism in Trecento
Florence: The Successes and Ultimate Failure of Corporate Politics, 84 Am. Historical Rev.
53, 56 (1979)).
166. E.g. Summonses to the Parliament of November 1295, reprinted in Bisson, supra n.
136, at 147- 148 (reciting the doctrine that "what touches all should be approved by all" in
setting forth the purpose of the summons and commanding county, town, and eccliesial
representatives to attend).
167. Id. (describing the requirement for bishops, clergy, barons , shires, and towns to
send representatives with "full and sufficient power" to act for their constituencies).
168. Supra nn . 35--61 and accompanying text (describing the Japanese merchant
house).
169. Hirschmeier & Yui, supra n. 38, at 45.
170. Id .
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that point were aware of when and why the tradition of board
governance started. However, what was visible to the Japanese
and others was a form of business that had a tremendous advantage in raising capital by selling shares to large numbers of
strangers and that seemed always to have a board of directors at
its helm. Hence, the Japanese and other non-Europeans did what
people often do: They assumed that correlation equaled causation
and, in adopting the joint-stock company, also adopted the governance structure they assumed was necessary for such companies-a board of directors.
Of course, just because corporate boards came out of political
theory, rather than business efficiency concerns, and long predated the joint-stock company does not necessarily mean that the
joint-stock company would have arisen without corporate boards.
It is often the case that an invention originally directed toward
one purpose finds other uses (as in the case of gunpowder). 171 Perhaps the existence of governing boards in the regulated trading
companies facilitated the evolution of these companies into jointstock companies. There are two possibilities along this line: one
based upon investor perception, the other based upon the actual
impact of boards on performance.
An investor-perception impact arose if persons would not
have invested in the joint-stock companies unless they had the
right to vote for representatives on a governing board. In a sense,
this would be the seventeenth- through nineteenth-century
equivalent of the so-called "law matters" thesis, which asserts
that greater minority shareholder protections explain the presence of widely dispersed shareholdings in some countries . 112 Interestingly enough, the notion that a person would not invest without the ability to vote for representatives on a governing board
might, itself, reflect European cultural and political ideas, and not
something shared by those from other cultures or political traditions. For example, Chinese investors in the first Chinese jointstock companies were used to a tradition of nonintervention with
the hired managers of their businesses, and, hence, did not re171. Historians believe the Chinese originally invented gunpowder for use in making
firecrackers. Columbia Encyclopedia, Gunpowder, http://www.encyclopedia.com/html/gl/
gunpowder.asp (accessed Feb. 23, 2004).
172. Brian R. Cheff'ms, Does Law Matter? The Separation of Ownership and Control in
the United Kingdom, 30 J. Leg. Stud. 459, 461-462 (2001).
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quest control but instead readily invested based upon trust in the
managers. 173
Exploring the impact of corporate boards on corporate performance is well beyond the scope of this Article. 174 As mentioned
in the introduction to this Article, observers have long been skeptical about how much impact corporate boards really have had.
Yet the fact that large corporations have prospered and have contributed to modem economic prosperity suggests that there must
be something right about the management structure of corporations-notwithstanding
complaints arising from periodic corporate meltdowns . Still, it is difficult to read the work of economic
historians without coming to the conclusion that the managerial
developments that made corporations work are those-like the
development of the U-form and M-form organizational structures-that
occurred below the level of the board of directors. 175
Along the same lines, the history of corporate management in Japan suggests that professional managers acting in a hierarchical
fashion, not the board of directors as an institution, made Japa.
nese corpora t ions
success ful .176
173. Chan, supra n . 61 , at 73.
174. Various recent studies attempt to assess the impact of board composition and
other corporate governance practices on corporate performance. Many of the results have
been inconclusive. E.g . Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Be·
tween Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 Bus. Law. 921, 922 (1999) (reviewing
over 100 studies and finding no convincing evidence that independent directors improve
firm performance); Robert W. Hamilton, Corporate Governance in America 1950-2000:
Major Changes But Uncertain Benefits, 25 J . Corp . L. 349, 359-373 (1999) (studies have
not produced collllistent positive results from changes in corporate governance, such as
increased use of independent directors) . Studies in less-developed economies suggest perhaps a greater impact . Mark Mobius, Issues in Global Corporate Governance, in Corporate
Governance: An Asia-Pacific Critique 47-48 (Low Chee Keong ed., Sweet & Maxwell Asia
2002) (discussing recent studies in emerging markets that show better stock performance
of companies with so-called "better corporate governance," including more independent
boards). Nevertheless, it is difficult to say how much of this result comes from having a
board versus from other so-called "good corporate-governance practices ." It is also hard to
say how much of improved market returns reflect investors' current desire for the stock of
companies with so-called "better corporate-governance practices," and how much reflects
actual improved performance by such corporations.
175. E.g. Richard S. Tedlow, The Rise of the American Business Corporation 13-24, 5560 (Harwood Academic Publishers 1991) (illustrating structures adopted by railroads in
the shift from mercantile partnerships, and later development of the U-form (unitary) and
M-form (multidivisional) organizations) .
176. See Yui, supra n. 100, at 11-21 (describing the development of management of
joint-stock companies by a senior executive director, aided by junior executive directors,
and the lack of development of the board of directors as a decision-making body in Meiji
Japan).
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Indeed, there is a certain irony in reading complain ts from
contemporary observers of the early Japanese boards of directors,
who castigated the members of these boards for not doing anything. 177These writings assumed that directors on the boards of
Western companies were actively managing their businesses. 178
Yet, to read the writings of observers of the boards of Western
companies is to see the same complaints about boards that did not
do anything but defer to management. 179It may be that the best
that can be said of the board of directors as an institution is that
it is mostly harmless.

N. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON WHY IT MATTERS
Two broad lessons emerge from examining the reasons
why the corporate board of directors originated in Europe
and spread around the world. The first lesson has to do with
business governance, political and cultural ideas, and assumptions about wealth-maximizing efficiencies. Law-and-economicsoriented scholarship often seems to assume that businessgovernance institutions exist because they serve some efficiency.180However, the origins of the corporate board of directors
in medieval European political theory, and the use of other governance arrangements in societies where political and cultural
ideas were different, show that human beings, even in the business context, do not divorce their notions of how to run a business
from their broader political and cultural ideas. 181Moreover, the
history of the spread of the corporate board of directors suggests

177. Id. at 7 (referring to Ukichi Taguchi, the publisher of the Tokyo Keizai Zasshi,
then Japan's most influential economic journal, who wrote in 1884, "directors [of Japanese
banks] might as well be retired .... [T]he president handles everything himself.").
178. Id. at 8 (referring to another article by Taguchi).
179. For such a description of an English board of directors in a work of fictional literature written not long before the complaints by Taguchi about Japanese boards, see Anthony Trollope, The Way We Live Now (Oxford U. Press 1982) (originally published in
1875) ("Melmotte himself [the chief executive officer of the company and perpetrator of a
fraudulent promotion] would speak a few slow words ... always indicative of triumph, and
then everybody would agree to everything, somebody would sign something, and the
'Board' ... would be over."). For later complaints about inaction by boards in the United
States and elsewhere, see supra n. 6 and accompanying text.
180. E.g. Fama & Jensen, supra n. 111, at 301.
181. For a recent attempt to document this phenomenon statistically, see Amir N .
Licht, The Mother of All Path Dependencies: Toward A Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate
Governance Systems, 26 Del. J. Corp. L. 147 (2001).
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that the adoption of business governance institutions may occur
because they appear to work , not necessarily because they do.
The second lesson to emerge from this discussion of the ori gins and the spread of the corporate board of directors is to point
out the promise and the pitfalls of comparative law as a force for
change. Simply put, the spread of the board of directors might
show, once again, the wisdom of the precept that "a little knowledge is a dangerous thing ." In this instance, comparative study,
which is merely descriptive, can be a useful starting point in suggesting other ways of doing things . Before copying other institutions, however , it is helpful to understand fully the historical and
cultural forces that produced those institutions .

